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NEGLIGENCE-DUTY OF LANDLORD TowARD His OWN SocIAL GtmsT IN-
JURED ON A CoMMON STAIRWAY-Defendant was co-owner of an apartment 
house and occupied one of the apartments. Plaintiff, his invited social guest, 
was injured while descending the common stairway because of defendant's 
negligence in failing to provide adequate lighting. A directed verdict for the 
defendant was affirmed by the appellate division1 on the ground that plaintiff 
as a social guest of the landowner was only a licensee. On appeal to the su-
preme court, held, reversed, three judges dissenting.2 A social guest of the 
landlord is an invitee while on the common stairway and therefore may recover 
for injuries sustained due to negligent maintenance of the premises. T aneian 
v. Meghrigian, 15 N.J. 267, 104 A. (2d) 689 (1954). 
It is well settled that a social guest of a landowner, even if expressly invited, 
is a mere licensee.3 Although direct authority is lacking where the injury is 
sustained on a common passageway,4 it seems clear that such a case comes within 
the purview of this general rule. Thus the principal case cannot be regarded 
as following prior authority but must be recognized as the first attempt to modify 
the social guest rule. The question is whether such a deflection from well-
established principles is justified. The basis of the court's decision was that the 
landlord is already under the duty to maintain the stairway with due care for 
guests of the tenants who, to him, are invitees while on areas of common control;5 
the fact that the occupant visited by the guest happens to be the landlord 
1 27 N.J. Super. 177, 99 A. (2d) 207 (1953). 
2 The dissent was based on the ground that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence. 
3 See 25 A.L.R. (2d) 598 (1952). In respect to defects in the premises, the land-
owner's only duty is to warn his licensee of traps. Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 
78 A. (2d) 693 (1951); 2 TORTS RllsTATEMBNT §342 (1934). 
4 Schmidt v. Langer, 336 ID. App. 158, 83 N.E. (2d) 34 (1948), may be directly 
in point. It was not, however, clear whether the decision in that case was based on the 
guest's status as a licensee or the fact that the defendant was not negligent. Southcote v. 
Stanley, 1 H. & N. 247, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (1856), denied recovery to an innkeeper's 
social guest whose injury was caused by a defective front door. In Bartkowski v. Schrembs, 
45 Ohio L. Abs. 597, 67 N.E. (2d) 922 (1944), although the injury was sustained on a 
private stairway, it is significant that the court also finds the plaintiff to be a licensee on 
the broader ground that he is a social visitor of the landlord's employee. This indicates that 
the same result would have been reached if the accident occurred on a common stairway. 
5 Gibson v. Hoppman, 108 Conn. 401, 143 A. 635 (1928); Schabel v. Onseyga 
Realty Co., 233 App. Div. 208, 251 N.Y.S. 280 (1931). 
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should not exclude the guest from such protection. Under the traditional view, 
however, the landlord owes such a duty to his tenants' guests only because it is 
implied as part of the consideration for which the tenant pays his rent. 6 There 
is no such business advantage from which it may be implied that the landlord 
assumes a similar duty to his own guests. A possible basis for the court's reason-
ing may be the theory that the plaintiff is using the stairway for the purposes for 
which it was thrown open.7 But courts have rejected similar arguments in cases 
involving a charity solicitor8 and a distributor of discount coupons.9 Another 
course of reaso~ing is more persuasive. The court granted the plaintiff the 
protection afforded an invitee when on the common stairway while admitting 
that under the social guest doctrine she was a licensee when in the defendant's 
apartment itself.10 This suggests that the social guest doctrine should be ap-
plied only to guests in the home and not to visitors on what may be called 
business premises.11 Society having attached a sacred quality to the concept of 
the home, it can be argued that the social guest doctrine developed only be-
cause it would be inconsistent with this concept to inlpose on a person the 
burden of maintaining his borne with due care for all who come to visit him. 
Though no court has specifically recognized this as the reason for the doctrine, a 
combination of several factors seem to support it. First, the overwhelming 
majority of cases in which the doctrine has been applied have concerned injuries 
on premises which are generally regarded as part of a home.12 Secondly, a rea-
son given by many courts for the social guest rule is that a guest can expect 
the premises to be maintained only with the same care with which the host 
maintains them for his own family;13 this clearly seems to refer only to the host's 
duty in his own home. Third, the reluctance of the courts to impose the duty 
of due care on the homeowner can be seen in the strained logic used in several 
cases to relegate to the status of social guest a person who ostensibly appeared to 
be a business visitor entitled to invitee status.14 Even if this theory is accepted 
and the plaintiff thereby removed from within the scope of the social guest doc-
6 Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383, 128 A. 705 (1925). 
7 This is the theo:ry of Dean Prosser. See Prosser, ''Business Visitors and Invitees," 
26 MINN. L. REv. 573 at 601 (1942). 
s Jones v. Asa G. Candler, 22 Ga. App. 717, 97 S.E. 112 (1918). 
9 Stacy v. Shapiro, 212 App. Div. 723, 209 N.Y.S. 305 (1925). 
10 Principal case at 281. 
11 A common stairway falls within the business premises classification in that the 
courts have imposed the duty of due care on the landlord because of the business relation-
ship existing between the landlord and his tenants. 
12 See 25 A.L.R. (2d) 598 (1952). Goldberg v. Straus, (Fla. 1950) 45 S. (2d) 883 
(front lawn); Sanders v. Brown, 73 Ariz. 116, 238 P. (2d) 941 (1951) (driveway). 
1a Morril v. Morril, 104 N.J.L. 557, 142 A. 337 (1928); Biggs v. Bear, 320 ill. App. 
597, 51 N.E. (2d) 799 (1943). 
14 In Colbert v. Ricker, 314 Mass. 138, 49 N.E. (2d) 459 (1943), H and W were 
husband and wife. At W's invitation P came to their home to transact business with H. 
For injuries sustained due to negligent maintenance of the premises, P sued W, the reg-
istered owner of the house. Recovery was denied on the ground that P was only a social 
guest of W. See also Sanders v. Brown, note 12 supra. 
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trine, the problem still remains as to what status the plaintiff should be awarded. 
It has been contended that a social visitor confers a real benefit on the land-
owner and therefore should always be considered an invitee.15 Another pos-
sibility is by analogy to Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery,16 in which case a fireman 
was injured in a driveway commonly used for business purposes. The court de-
cided that since the fireman was not on the premises solely for his own purposes, 
he was more than a licensee, and at least when on business premises should be 
granted the protection of an invitee.17 The same reasoning could be applied 
to the social guest injured on the common stairway, which is part of the land-
lord's business premises. It should also be noted that the negligence in the 
instant case was predicated on the violation of a statutory duty.18 A basis for 
recovery in the instant case could be found in the dicta of some cases applying 
similar statutes, this dicta being to the effect that anyone lawfully on the 
premises would be in the class which the legislature intended to protect 19 Re-
gardless of the technical legal reasoning, the result of the instant case is justified 
in that it grants protection to a rightful user of the premises without increasing 
the burden on the landowner, who already had the general duty to maintain 
this part of the premises with due care. 
Lawrence Sperling 
15 McCarthy, "The Liability of a Possessor of Land in Missouri to Persons Injured 
While on the Land," 1 Mo. L. R.Ev. 45 at 58 (1936). 
16 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920). 
17 See Bohlen, "The Duty of a Landowner Towards Those Entering His Premises of 
Their Own Right," 69 Umv. PA. L. R.Ev. 142 (1921). 
lS N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §55:5-15. For common law and statutory duty to keep 
common passageways well lighted, see 25 A.L.R. (2d) 496 (1952). 
19 Gibson v. Hoppman, note 5 supra; Roth v. Protos, 120 N.J.L. 502, 1 A. (2d) 10 
(1938). 
